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ABSTRACT 
This paper is intended to recognize the performance of REITs in Japan (J-REITs) by conducting two kinds 
of studies in a REIT-level and an underlying property-level: first, to do “factor loadings” that identify 
systematic risks of long run investment performance in J-REITs; second, to demonstrate “Pure Play 
Indices,” segment-specific indices of REIT-based property market returns by tracking monthly REIT 
return data and property holding data. 
The first study employs the Fama-French three-factor model for monthly J-REIT returns from September 
2001 to September 2008.  This investigation upgrades past similar research with longer data periods in a 
two-stage regression (a time-series regression and a cross-sectional regression) for all the listed J-REITs.  
Nevertheless, the model results in a limited explanatory power for the J-REIT performance, probably due 
to too short a market history, as in the past research.   
The second study applies the Pure Play Indices, originally proposed by Geltner and Kluger [1995, 1998], 
to the J-REITs for office, residential, and retail segments since January 2006 when the J-REIT market 
became sizable enough for study.  The developed Pure Play Indices perform similarly with the J-REIT 
return indices, except the Pure Play Residential Index during the down market due to the effect of 
non-target segments within the J-REITs.  The reason for this effect will require a further study.   
As the market matures with more data accumulated, this two-fold study that shows demonstration of 
returns from J-REITs will become more valuable to derive risk of J-REITs and different types of 
information of properties.  
 
Thesis Supervisor: David Geltner 
Title: Professor of Real Estate Finance, 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1-1. Research Objective 
 Real Estate Investment Trusts in Japan (J-REITs) have undergone a dramatic change since they 
were established in September 2001.  There was a time when the J-REIT market grew to 60 billion U.S. 
dollars with 42 REITs, but it shrank to around one-third by April 2009, due to the credit crunch caused by 
subprime problems.  The J-REIT market history is still too short for a practical study to be conducted.  
However, because the market history has contained up-down economic cycles, it would be worthwhile to 
study the historical performance of J-REITs. 
This paper examines the performance characteristics of J-REITs from the two standpoints of 
their stock returns and underlying properties’ return, thinking of a historical perspective.  REITs are a 
unique hybrid of real property assets and the firm-level financial conditions, with liquidity as publicly 
traded securities.  The daily value judgment of J-REITs in the market considers those features, so it is 
fundamental to study the different two fields of underlying real estates and securities (capital) for the 
purpose of a comprehensive understanding of a product such as J-REITs.  What affects J-REIT returns 
and how much of their performance can be explained by capital market factors?  How have the J-REIT 
properties performed so far and how have they related to the firm-level returns (J-REIT returns)?  How 
do these observations vary throughout the study period or the property segments? 
 
1-2. Thesis Framework 
 In order to answer these questions, this paper has a two-fold objective after introducing a brief 
history and characteristics of the J-REIT market in the second chapter.  The first objective is described in 
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the third and fourth chapters where this paper conducts “factor loadings,” which identify systematic 
determinants of long run investment performance in J-REITs.  The other objective is explored in the fifth 
and sixth chapters which demonstrate a “Pure Play” model that retrieves REIT-based property returns 
purely to target property segments.  The Pure Play model is used to observe their historical performance 
and to demonstrate how it can be used for a practical investment strategy in J-REITs. 
 Discussion of the factor loadings begins with reviewing the past research on the effectiveness of 
a representative asset pricing model such as the Fama-French three-factor model (FF model) in the 
Japanese market.  Kubota and Takehara [2007] examined the effectiveness of the FF model in the 
Japanese stock market.  Ohashi [2003, 2004, 2005], Kawaguchi [2005], The Association for Real estate 
Securitization (ARES) [2007] did factor loading by stocks, bonds, or the FF three-factors in the J-REIT 
market.  However, in general these preceding studies did not directly mention the relationship between 
the J-REIT returns and real estate returns.  Due to data constraints, a research methodology was limited 
to a time-series regression for a J-REIT index that measures only the impact of the risk factors. 
 To compensate for these limitations, in the fourth chapter this paper actually applies the FF 
model to the J-REIT market by extending the data period up to seven years and modifying the 
methodology into a two-stage regression.  This experiment not only identifies betas (estimated 
coefficients) across all the J-REIT monthly returns by a time-series regression, but also examines the 
robustness of the model by a cross-sectional regression for the betas gained from the time-series 
regression.  In addition, to ensure the interpretation, this paper analyzes by sub-periods and by 
main-asset segments (property type). 
 The study of application of a “Pure Play” model starts in the fifth chapter with providing the 
characteristics and methodology of REIT-based property return indices originally proposed in the U.S. 
REITs by Geltner and Kluger [1995, 1998] and Horrigan [2009].  In the sixth chapter this study applies 
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the model to the J-REITs.  This paper firstly demonstrates the “Pure Play” indices to retrieve the 
property returns to the three major use (office, residential, and commercial1), based on the twenty eight 
months since January 2006.  Then this study illustrates sample Pure Play Portfolio weights with targets 
on each property segment and Markowitz efficient portfolios to show how the “Pure Play” method can be 
useful in principle for synthetic investment in property through derivatives. 
 The last chapter summarizes the findings of these two core experiments, and proposes the 
requirements for further studies.  Since the data infrastructure of J-REITs is not yet well consolidated, 
this kind of meticulous but comprehensive investigation is rare and therefore will be hopefully of help to 
both academic pursuits and practical business.  
                                                   
1 Conforming to Japanese parlance, in this paper, “commercial” means a retail-type property. 
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Chapter 2 Overview of the Japan-REIT Market 
 
   Now REITs in Japan are getting a significant portion among twenty-one countries in the 
world, with the fifth largest market capitalization of 36.5 billion U.S. dollars, which constitutes around a 
6% share of the global REIT market as of March 2008.  However, because the REIT market in Japan has 
only an eight and a half year history, and many of the research works on the market have been limited in 
Japanese, its characteristics have not become widely known to the world.  In order to provide a thorough 
understanding of J-REITs before going into further analyses, this chapter describes a brief history and 
characteristics of the J-REIT market since its inception. 
 
2-1. Brief History 
 A REIT is an investment trust dedicated to owning, and in most cases, operating 
income-producing real estate, such as apartments, shopping centers, offices and warehouses.  Most 
REITs raise equity capital from investors, but have a special tax status that allows them to avoid corporate 
tax as long as nearly all REIT-income is distributed to investors in the form of dividends.  This REIT 
structure enables small business transactions with a high liquidity and a transparent price in real estate 
investment.  The first REIT debuted in the United States in the 1960s as a financial product of real estate 
investments; it was hoped that REITs would diversify investment portfolios, since they offered both high 
liquidity as a financial product and stable earnings based on income as a real estate product.  
Japan-REITs (J-REITs) started in May 2000, when the revision of the Investment Trust and 
Investment Corporation Act (ITICA) expanded a trust’s target assets, which used to be limited to 
marketable securities, into real estate.  Two J-REITs were first listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) on September 10, 2001 (see Table [2-I]).  Then capitalization of the J-REIT market grew rapidly 
 9 / 63 
 
to 60 billion U.S. dollars with forty-two listed J-REITs in the prime of May 2007, but afterwards fell 
below 20 billion U.S. dollars as of February 2009, shrinking 67% from the peak after one J-REIT 
de-listed (see Table [2-II]).  Depending on market size and returns, the history of the J-REIT market can 
be divided generally into two stages.  One is an external growth period until August 2004, when the 
number of J-REITs was still limited but J-REITs were expanding in asset size.  Thereafter, another is an 
internal growth period, when the market became sizable enough, and J-REITs switched their focus to 
raising the internal rate of return. 
 
Table [2-I]: Number of Listed J-REITs (Sept. 2001 ~ Apr. 2009) 
 
(Created by the author, on the basis of monthly data from the ARES2) 
 
                                                   
2 The Association for Real estate Securitization (ARES). 
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Table [2-II]: Market Capitalization of the J-REIT Market (Sept. 2001 ~ Apr. 2009) 
(The average exchange rate since inception of the J-REIT market: 1 U.S. dollar = 113.12 yen) 
 
(Created by the author, on the basis of daily data from the ARES) 
 
Behind the rapid growth of the market in the early stage, there were several factors that 
encouraged investment in J-REITs.  One of the leading causes for the stable growth of the J-REIT 
markets was new institutional supports to drive investors into J-REIT investment.  For instance, both 
dividend tax and transfer tax were reduced from 20% to 10% by the government in December 2002.  
Around the same time, banks were allowed by the Japanese Bankers Association to count dividend 
income from J-REIT investments in the bank’s operating profit.  Furthermore, in May 2003, two 
J-REITs were built into the MSCI Japan Index that foreign pension funds utilized as their investment 
benchmark.  In July 2003, the new rule changed self-imposed regulation and allowed fund of funds to 
invest in J-REITs.  These changes expanded the range of type of investors in J-REITs to individuals and 
bankers. 
Another factor that led to the rapid growth of the J-REIT market was a large gap (“spread”) 
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between dividend yields of J-REITs and interest yields of ten-year government bonds (see Table [2-III]).  
In general, the higher the spread is, the higher the investment risk and return of the product are, in 
comparison with the risk-free ten-year government bond.  The spread hovered at a high of 2.0%~4.6% at 
the beginning of J-REIT market, which was risky and yet attractive enough to investors who faced low 
interest rates and the flagging stock market.  In the subsequent internal growth period, the spread 
decreased to, and kept at about 2%, which indicated that investors had become less uncertain in their 
response to J-REITs, and the J-REIT market entered a stable phase.  Afterwards, in the middle of 2007, 
the spread lowered to 1% along with the increasing capitalization of the J-REIT market, but turned out to 
expand in the recent subprime-effect period. 
 
Table [2-III]: Dividend Yield of J-REITs and Government Bonds 
 
(Created by author, based on monthly data from STB and Bank of Japan during Sept.2001 ~Feb. 2009) 
 
2-2. Characteristics of J-REIT Investment 
As for the forms of investment, the ITICA sets two types: the Investment Trust Institution and 
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Investment Corporation Institution. At this point in time, J-REITs are all based on the Investment Trust 
Institution.  Furthermore, there are two types of Investment Trust Institution: one is an open-end type, 
which allows its investors to claim a refund; another is a closed-end type, which does not.  Traditional 
marketable securities employ an open-end type, since it offers liquidity to investors.  But all the existing 
J-REITs choose a closed-end type, since it is difficult for J-REITs to sell their properties expeditiously and 
thereby gain cash.  Instead, J-REITs offer the chance for redemption in market dealings.  
In terms of business, J-REITs are prohibited from operating under general management, storage 
of investment, and asset management, but they are allowed to outsource those jobs to management 
companies.  REITs with such a scheme are called “externally operated REITs,” and J-REITs are taking 
this form, while many REITs in the United States (“US-REITs”) are internally operated.  Also, there is 
more than one type of REIT in the United States, depending on the type of asset—including an equity 
REIT3, a mortgage REIT4, and a hybrid REIT5—but in Japan there is only an equity REIT.   
The total value of the properties held by all the J-REITs as of April 2009 is around 68 billion 
U.S. dollars, based on purchase prices.  Table [2-IV] shows the breakdown of the properties according to 
their uses: office and residential uses dominate almost equally more than 70% of the total assets.  In 
addition, J-REITs tend to focus on a certain property type, as will be described in the sixth chapter.  The 
breakdown of the properties by regions in Table [2-V] shows nearly 60% of them concentrated inside 
Tokyo, and over 70% in the Kanto area, in the vicinity of Tokyo.  
 
                                                   
3 An Equity REIT is a trust that purchases, owns and manages real estate properties; it does not own or 
originate real estate loans. 
4 A mortgage REIT is a trust that purchases owns and manages real estate loans; it does not own real estate 
properties. 
5 A hybrid REIT is a trust that purchases owns and manages both real estate loans and real estate properties. It 
has the qualities of both an equity and mortgage REIT which is why it is referred to as a hybrid. 
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Table [2-IV]: J-REIT Property Type Breakdown as of April 2009 
 
(Created by author, based on J-REITs’ settlement report) 
 
Table [2-V]: J-REIT Property Region Breakdown as of April 2009, and Map of Japan Districts 
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(Created by author, based on individual J-REITs’ settlement report) 
 
2-3. Performance of J-REITs 
J-REITs remained stagnant in the initial stage, not only because investors were unfamiliar with 
the characteristics of J-REITs, but also because a huge supply of large-scale buildings in 2003 was 
anticipated to affect the balance between supply and demand in the real estate market.  When it turned 
out in late 2004 that the building supply did not affect the market as much as anticipated, and as more and 
more J-REITs proved their high dividend payout ratio at closings, the J-REIT market started to flourish.   
Table [2-VI] shows historical price indices of J-REITs presented by STBRI J-REIT Index,6 
stocks by the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) 7, and real estate company stocks by the TOPIX Real 
                                                   
6 The STBRI J-REIT Index consists of a composite index that includes all listed J-REITs and sub-indices 
classified by property types since September 10, 2001, the date of the first listing of J-REIT issues on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The STBRI J-REIT Index® is calculated by accumulating the daily weighted 
average of returns, similar calculation methods used by the FTSE NAREIT US Real Estate Index, which is the 
best-known REIT benchmark in the United States.  This index is developed by the STB Research Institute 
(STB Research). 
7 TOPIX is a free-float adjusted market capitalization-weighted index that is calculated based on all the 
domestic common stocks listed on the TSE First Section.  TOPIX shows the measure of current market 
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Estate Index8.  The J-REIT price index reached the top in May 2007, but headed straight downhill 
thereafter, due to the global credit crunch originally caused by a subprime problem.  J-REITs fell by 
73.0% in price during the period from May 2007 to the most recent, which is well below 60.9% of 
TOPIX’s drop around the same period.  This notable drop in J-REIT prices in late 2008 can be attributed 
to the default of a J-REIT as the first default case of an equity REIT in the world and to consecutive 
defaults of J-REITs’ sponsors.  TOPIX Real Estate Index fluctuates more than STBRI J-REIT Index 
since companies that operate or develops real estate have a riskier profit structure than REITs whose 
business is limited to hold real estate. 
 
Table [2-VI]: Price Indices of J-REITs, Stocks and Real Estate  
 
(Created by author, based on daily data during Sept.2001 ~Apr. 2009, with assumption that a price as of 
the base date (September 10, 2001) is 1,000 point)  
 
But it was not only Japan that has had such a terrible performance since 2008.  In Table [2-VII], 
                                                                                                                                                                    
capitalization assuming that market capitalization as of the base date (January 4, 1968) is 100 point. 
8 TOPIX Real Estate Index is one of the TOPIX Sector Indices that consist of indices created by dividing the 
constituents of TOPIX into the following 33 categories according to the industrial sectors defined by the 
Securities Identification Code Committee (SICC).  The TOPIX Sector Indices shows the measure of current 
market capitalization assuming that market capitalization as of the base date (January 4, 1968) is 100 point. 
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many other REITs in the world, especially REITs in Asia, have also posted drastically negative returns.  
This table indicates that the poor performance is not necessarily due to factors specific to the J-REIT 
market. 
 
Table [2-VII]: Annual Returns of REITs in the World 
(REITs are listed in descending order of the size in market capitalization from the left) 
 
(Created by the author, based on data from the S&P global REIT TR Index for Global REIT, TSE 
NAREIT EQUITY REITs Total Return Index for United States-REIT (US-REIT), S&P/ASX 300 A-REIT 
Accumulation Index for Australia-REIT (LPT), TSE EPRA NAREIT UK REIT TR Index for the United 
Kingdom- REIT (UK- REIT), STBRI-J-REIT Total Return Index for Japan-REIT(J-REIT), FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT SINGAPORE - TOT RETURN IND for Singapore-REIT (S-REIT), FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT HONG KONG REIT - TOT RETURN IND for Hong-Kong-REIT (H-REIT)) 
 
 The characteristics of risks and returns to J-REITs have changed dramatically since 2007.  
Table [2-VIII] and [2-IX], where bonds are represented by the NOMURA Bond Performance Index 
(Nomura BPI9), show correlation and volatility of J-REITs, stocks and bonds. The J-REITs have gradually 
performed more and more favorably with stocks since 2007, and have accordingly increased the volatility, 
                                                   
9 The Nomura BPI Index is developed by Nomura Securities Global Quantitative Research (Nomura 
Securities) to measure the movement of Japanese bonds in the secondary market.  This index is calculated 
with the return on investments of a portfolio of all fixed income securities that meet certain criteria. 
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which has exceeded TOPIX’s volatility.  The market situation has deviated from how the attributes of 
J-REITs were originally expected, such as middle risk and middle return.  In addition, as can be seen in 
Table [2-III], it can be assumed from excessively widening spreads of the return of J-REITs over the 
risk-free rate that the current price level of J-REITs is greatly undervalued. 
 
Table [2-VIII]: Correlation of J-REITs with Stocks and Bonds 
 
(Created by the author, in 250 day-rolling, based on daily return data from STB, TSE, Nomura Securities, 
from Sept.2001 ~Feb. 2009)  
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Table [2-IX]: Volatility of J-REITs, Stocks, and Bonds 
 
(Created by the author, in 250 day-rolling, based on daily return data from Sept.2001 ~Feb. 2009)  
 
 This chapter found some characteristics of J-REIT investment.  The forty-one existing J-REITs 
are all equity REITs, focusing on office or residential types in Tokyo.  Also, the performance of J-REITs 
has shown a new trend from the effect of the weakening capital market, which has actually held down the 
growth of the J-REIT market.  Investigating risk factors to J-REITs in the capital market, and observing 
the underlying assets (properties) of J-REITs to capture performance characteristics, would be an 
important task for the robust recovery of the J-REIT market in future. 
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Chapter 3 Factor Loading: Literature Review 
  
This chapter reviews the past research of basic asset pricing models in the Japanese stock 
market including the J-REIT market, with a focus on the Fama-French three-factor model which will be 
performed in the next chapter. 
 
3-1. Evolution of Asset Pricing Model 
It is an asset pricing model for the estimation of expected returns and risks that creates the basis 
of risk management in capital market investment.  In an asset pricing model, a total risk based on the 
total volatility of an asset price consists of two types of risks: systematic risks and idiosyncratic 
(specific) risks.  Systematic risks refer to the risks based on the volatility of returns that are associated 
with common factors in the aggregate market.  Idiosyncratic risks refer to the component of an asset’s 
volatility that cannot be explained by those common factors in the market, but rather by a specific factor 
to the individual stock.  In Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), idiosyncratic risks can be minimized by 
diversification, while systematic risks cannot.  For this reason, systematic risks have been intensively 
researched as intrinsic risks.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) proposed by Sharpe [1962], Lintner [1963], and 
Mossin [1966] played a major role in MPT, on the basis of the mean-variance model. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): 
ri - rf= αi +βMi {rM –rf} +εi 
αi… excess return of stocki against βMi {rM –rf}, the portion related to the entire market. In an 
efficient market, αi should have a mean of zero over the long run. 
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ri…equity total return of stocki  
rM…total return of the market portfolio 
βM…exposure of stocki against the market portfolio 
rf….risk free rate  
εi…disturbance term that represents the idiosyncratic risk components for stocki.  The average of εi 
is zero. The correlation of εi and ri is zero. 
Here ri - rf represents a risk premium of stocki over the risk free rate.  rM –rf represents a 
market factor, an excess return of the stocki over the risk free rate. 
However, the accumulated evidence since the 1970s suggests that the original single-factor 
CAPM did not fully explain the long-run average returns achieved by different stocks.  In the mid-70s, 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) appeared and laid the basis for a multifactor model.  On the other hand, 
in some cases, the model had too many factors, as researchers wanted to raise the model’s explanatory 
power.  Consequently, it was the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model proposed by Fama and French 
[1993] that tested whether a model with a few common risk factors had an enough explanatory power.  
The FF model successfully improved the explanatory power of the model by adding a size-related factor 
(SMB) and a value-related factor (HML) to CAPM.  The model has become known for a high 
explanatory power in major equity markets in the world, and has been considered as a new de facto 
standard in academic papers. 
Fama-French Three-Factor Model: 
ri - rf= αi+βMi {rM –rf} + βSMBi rSMB +βHMLi rHML+εi 
where: 
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rSMB… return of small-firm stocks less return of large-firm stocks.   
rHML…return of high book-to-market ratio stocks less return on low book-to-market ratio stocks. 
In the United States, a multi-factor asset pricing model has been widely used and already 
established in the business world.  Likewise, in Japan, research on a multi-factor asset pricing model has 
been done, though not many studies so far and no clear indication has yet been produced.  There still 
exists a great need for more studies.  
 
3-2. Effectiveness of the Fama-French Three-Factor Model in the Japanese Stock Market 
Daniel and Titman [2001] carried early research on Japanese stock returns.  They ran a 
cross-sectional regression by the FF model for their own characteristic-sorted portfolios—with monthly 
indices from 1971 to 1997—given from a securities company, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Inc., and others.  
They concluded that CAPM does not hold in the Japanese stock market, while the FF model does well. 
In recent years, however, academic researchers have begun to throw doubt on the effectiveness 
of the FF model, which used existing indices, including stock price indices based on the stock’s 
attributes—such as liquidity, market capitalization, and price-book ratio—provided by securities 
companies and widely used in the business world.  Consequently, Kubota and Takehara [2007] proposed 
new indices specific to the FF model.  The newly measured indices there have been announced on the 
website of Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc., and they have been basics for the academic studies afterwards, 
as this paper employs them. 
In addition, Kubota and Takehara verified the effectiveness of the FF model in the Japanese 
Common Stock Market, using the multi-beta model proposed by Generalized Method of Moments, and 
the mean-variance efficiency test proposed by Gibbons, Ross and Shanken [1989].   Kubota and 
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Takehara used monthly returns for twenty-nine years from September 1977.  Although the FF model 
explained more than the CAPM did, its applicability in the Japanese stock market still left many questions 
unanswered, the research concluded.  The FF model worked only in the first half of the period—that is, 
until 1991—which agreed with Daniel and Titman, but did not do well in any other period.  Interestingly, 
the indication that the FF model basically did not work in the Japanese stock market contradicted similar 
studies on the United States Stock Market, where both the CAPM and the FF model basically did work.  
The inapplicability of the model was due to the SMB factor’s unstable relationship with the expected 
returns, depending on the periods.  In contrast, some common observations were reported with the 
studies on the United States stock market: the SMB factor has gotten less powerful and the HML factor is 
still working well.  But somehow, the observed HML factor in the Japanese market had a much stronger 
effect on the expected stock return than the HML factor in the U.S. market. 
 
3-3. Effectiveness of the Fama-French Three-Factor Model in the Japan-REIT Market 
Previous studies of the characteristics of the J-REIT market commonly indicate that the returns 
of J-REITs cannot be explained by systematic factors, but by idiosyncratic factors, the contents of which 
have not been clarified yet.  
Early representative work on this has been done by Ohashi [2003, 2004, 2005] and Kawaguchi 
[2005].  Ohashi pointed out that stocks and bonds could not explain the volatility of J-REIT returns, 
based on the monthly and weekly data, from the inception of the J-REIT market.  Kawaguchi tested the 
relationship among stocks, bonds and J-REITs, and as a result reminded that the different 
risk-characteristics of J-REITs from real estate stocks arise from their difference in the business 
description and earnings structure. 
The Association for Real Estate Securitization (ARES) [2007] widely examined multi-factor 
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models, including FF three-factors and long- and short-term interest rate disparities, based on the monthly 
returns for the five years since September 2001.  The ARES did a time-series regression for the monthly 
return of J-REITs represented by the QUICK REIT Index10 (with dividend) on the FF three-factors 
represented by the indices from Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc. 
In CAPM analysis, the ARES found that the Alpha was significant while the Beta was not.  
J-REITs produced more returns than risks during the study period.  But the coefficient of determination 
was much smaller than the US-REIT research of 10%.  In the FF model analysis, the size (SMB) factor 
was significant in a whole-period over the past five years, while it lost its significance within any one of 
the sub-periods.  The other two factors were rarely significant, except occasionally in the later 
sub-period.  The most notable conclusion was that the coefficient of determination was so low (although 
higher than that in CAPM analysis) that the excess returns of J-REITs must contain independent portions 
aside from the ordinarily used risk factors.  These results were in direct contrast to many research results 
concerning the US-REIT market, where all the FF three-factors show significance and the coefficient of 
determination actually becomes high enough.  However, because the US-REIT market has a much 
longer history and many more REITs, it may not be fair to compare the US-REITs with J-REITs, which 
have only a few newly-formed REITs. 
Most of the preceding works have missed an issue in that they have not taken into account the 
risk characteristics of the individual J-REIT firms, probably due to data constraints.  The analytical 
method has been basically limited to a time-series regression of an aggregate J-REIT index to measure its 
sensitivity to the risk factors.  In that sense, STB Research [2007] was a new study of a FF-like model 
with risk factors of stocks, bonds, and rents, by adding cross-sectional regression to time-series regression 
for the average excess returns of 25 J-REITs.  The data used was current up to February 2007.  Still, it 
                                                   
10 The QUICK REIT Index is a capitalization-weighted index based on all J-REITs listed on the Tokyo stock 
exchange since September 10, 2001.  This index is published by QUICK Corp. 
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turned out that those risk factors could explain only 30% of the J-REIT returns, and that the specific risk 
factors were significant only at the 15% level.  
To sum up, the review of the past research in this chapter illustrates that the FF model is superior 
to the CAPM as an asset pricing model, but so far does not work in the Japanese market as well as in the 
United States market.  In addition, it is indicated that a cross-sectional study of the pure FF model over 
the J-REIT market has not been done so much, due to data constraints.  These findings are followed up 
in the next analytical chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Factor Loading: Methodology and Result 
 
4-1. Methodology 
This chapter aims to investigate the relationship between risks and returns of the J-REITs, by 
using the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model.  The approach here upgrades the reliability of analysis 
in relation to past research in the following ways: this paper [1] considers the risk characteristics of 
individual J-REITs by a series of regressions in a two-stage process; [2] is based on a longer dataset, 
including periods after 2007 when the J-REIT market was most volatile, and including the major market 
downturn; and [3] tests the robustness of the regression result by two patterns of sub-period analysis and 
by asset type-classification of the J-REITs.  
In the first stage, this chapter regresses price returns of a J-REIT on the FF three-factors in order 
to estimate “Beta,” estimated coefficient (sensitivity of the J-REIT to risk factors) for the individual 
J-REITs.  This is a longitudinal analysis based on the historical data.  The estimated coefficients at this 
stage are referred to as the “factor loadings.”  At the second stage, this chapter runs a regression of the 
historical average risk premiums of the individual J-REITs onto the factor loadings (βMi,t, βSMBi,t, 
βHMLi,t)—or the Beta from the first stage regression—in order to examine the explanatory power of this 
model on the expected returns across the individual J-REITs.  The definitions of the variables in the 
following formulas are omitted as they are the same as those in Chapter 3. 
Time Series Regression (at time t): 
ri,t - rf,t = αi,t +βMi,t {rM,t –rf,t} + βSMBi,t rSMB,t +βHMLi,t rHML,t +εi,t    (1) 
Cross Sectional Regression: 
Average (ri - rf) = γ0 +γ1 βM +γ2 βSMBi +γ3βHMLi +εi         
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 (2) 
This paper uses monthly data from September 10, 2001 to September 30, 2008, and applies the 
models over all 42 J-REITs listed on the stock/securities exchange in Japan during that period.  
Considering the ease with which past research has made comparisons, this paper also employs monthly 
data, regardless of the length of the period, in this case as short as seven years.  In addition, for the 
purpose of complementing the limited data and checking the structural change of coefficients, this paper 
runs a series of regressions in two patterned sub-periods.  In the first case (Case 1), the data period is 
sub-divided at August 2004, by which time all the major asset types of J-REITs end external growth (IPO) 
period and after which entered into the internal growth period (stable set of firms), according to the 
maturational stage of the J-REIT market.  In the second case (Case 2), the data period is sub-divided into 
upward phase and downward phase at May 2007, the peak of the stock price, according to the stock price 
trend of the J-REIT market.11 
Case 1:  External Growth Period (September 2001 ~ August 2004),  
Internal Growth Period (September 2004 ~ September2008) 
Case 2:  Upward Phase (September 2001 ~ May 2007),  
Downward Phase (June 2007 ~ September2008) 
 This paper also discusses the regression results classified by the major asset types of the 
individual J-REITs, in order to see the performance of the model in different portfolios and to identify the 
effect by asset type. 
 A difference in approach from Fama and French’s research lies in the timing of taking Beta and 
                                                   
11 For the grounds for definition of these sub-periods, see Chapter 2, “An Overview of the Japan-REIT 
Market.” 
 27 / 63 
 
the return.  Fama and French ran a regression for an ex-post return on an ex-ante Beta by staggering the 
target period.  In contrast, this paper tests the relationship between an ex-post average return and an 
ex-post Beta within a certain period due to the short period of time since the J-REIT market foundation. 
  
4-2. Data and Its Characteristics 
Monthly total returns of J-REITs are calculated on the basis of the data from ARES.  As for the 
data source for FF three-factors, this paper uses indices published by Nikkei Media Marketing, which 
were calculated especially for the FF model in keeping with the study by the ARES [2007]12:  “The 
monthly return of the market portfolio is the monthly return (with dividend) of the portfolio for all issues 
on the first and second tier of the TSE weighted by their market capitalizations, and the size (SMB) factor 
monthly return is the monthly return obtained by subtracting the stock portfolio of the top 50% market 
caps from the stock portfolios of the lowest 50% market caps.  The value (HML) factor monthly returns 
is the monthly return obtained by subtracting the bottom 30% of the stock portfolio from the top 30% of 
the stock portfolio on a book value ratio basis.  In addition, the risk free interest rate (short-term interest) 
is interpreted to be the value when the average monthly overnight secured call rate is converted to a 
monthly rate.” (ARES [2007]: p. 28). 
The basic statistics of those monthly returns in the whole period are shown in Table [4-I] with 
all J-REITs in the listed order.  The asset type investment policy of the J-REIT is also shown based on its 
announcement and actual investment allocation.  The average risk premium of the J-REITs falls to well 
below the averages of the FF three-factors.  Although the early-listed J-REITs seem to earn higher and 
more positive returns, it is not known exactly whether the high returns are due to the listed timing or the 
asset type, because the J-REITs investing offices seem to earn high returns and the early-listed J-REITs 
                                                   
12 See Chapter 3, “Factor Loading: Literature Review.” 
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were likely to focus on office types.   
 
Table [4-I]: Basis Statistics 
(J-REITs are lined by the listed order.) 
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 Table [4-II] shows correlation among the average risk premium of the J-REITs (defined as 
“J-REIT Average” in the table), market factor, SMB factor, and HML factor in three patterns of periodical 
analysis: the whole period, Case 1, Case 2. 
 Except for the market factor, all the factors are almost uncorrelated to each other, both in the 
whole period and any sub-periods, which is good for the model.  The notable attributes are that the 
relationship of the J-REITs with the SMB factor is unstable, and that the J-REITs had an extremely low 
relationship with the HML factor.  These attributes tie in with the ARES [2007].  A step to the 
sub-period analysis in Cases 1 and 2 clarifies that the correlation trends in both cases are the same, in 
spite of the distant division timing: the J-REITs positively correlate with all the other factors in the early 
period, but weaken or invert around the middle period, and then come to negatively correlate with the 
SMB and HML factors in the later period.  In particular, the later period strongly shows a similar 
tendency to that in the whole period.  These facts lead an additional indication that the correlative 
formations in the very early period and the very late period are relatively clear, while they are ambiguous 
in the middle period.    
These results from the correlation matrix should reflect the explanatory power of each factor 
towards the risk premium of the J-REITs. 
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Table [4-II]: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
4-3. Time-Series Regression Result 
i) Whole Period Analysis: 
The result of the time-series regression proved to be interesting.  Table [4-III] plots on the 
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vertical axis the ex-post average excess returns (over the risk-free rate) of each REIT as a function (on the 
horizontal axis) of the factor loadings estimated for each REIT in the longitudinal regressions.  This 
provides a gross image of the risk/return profile.  The four graphs refer to the three risk factors (Market, 
SMB, and HML) plus the intercept (the Alpha of each REIT over the period studied).  An asterisk (*) 
shows the average result of all the 42 J-REITs. 
 
Table [4-III]: Time-Series Regression – the Average Risk Premium and Alpha/Beta – 
   
  
The “intercept” plot shows that most of the J-REITs have negative Alphas.  It turns out that 
many J-REITs during the period studied did not give as high returns as what their risk factor loadings 
would have implied (presuming that the FF model is a good model of J-REIT risk and return expectations 
among investors).  In the plots of the Betas (factor loadings) of the three-factors, there is a lot of 
dispersion, and it is hard to tell the risk/return relationship.  In the “market factor” plot, all the J-REITs 
have positive factor loadings with a very weak positive relationship between Beta and the achieved excess 
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return.  The average loading on the SMB factor is negative, which means the expected return toward 
J-REITs with big market capitalization is higher than those with small market capitalization.  The plot of 
the HML factor effect resembles that of the market factor, but shows an even less positive relationship 
between the risk factor and the achieved returns (indeed, the fitted line is slightly negative sloped).   
These results are generally similar to those of Kubota and Takehara [2007], the aforementioned 
past research on the effectiveness of the FF model with longer historical data, in that they also found that 
the FF model only weakly explains achieved returns, and especially that the effect of the SMB factor is 
unclear.  To the contrary, the resulted tendency of the Alpha and Betas here does not simply follow the 
results of the ARES [2007], the past similar research on the J-REIT market.  The cause of the mismatch 
may be attributed to the difference in the regression method,13 or to the collapse of the J-REIT market 
since 2007, which this paper includes but the past research does not. 
In the results of the time-series regression classified by the main asset type of the individual 
J-REIT (see Table [4-IV]), the factor loadings of each asset type look similar.  Although all the factors 
rarely signify anyway, it can be read out that the J-REIT mainly targeting the residential group has high 
risk/low return due to the low return tendency. 
 
                                                   
13 Remember that ARES [2007] regressed the QUICK J-REIT Index that is weighted by the market 
capitalization of all J-REITs. 
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Table [4-IV]: Time-Series Regression by Main Asset Type  
 
 
ii) Sub-period Analysis (Cases 1 & 2): 
Let’s test the effect of division timing on the results.  Table [4-V] lays out the time-series 
regression results of the whole period, Case 1 and Case 2 in a line for comparison. The figures in the table 
present the average of the regression results of all the J-REITs. 
In both Case 1 and Case 2, the Betas of the factors clearly change its sign from the first half to 
the second half of the periods, and the second half period shows a similar result to the whole period 
analysis.  In particular, the change is more dramatic in the downward phase in Case 2, the period since 
the sub-prime effect in 2007, as was expected in the previous section.  The Alpha is undervalued in the 
first half of the period, but is overvalued in the latter half.  The market factor always earns positive 
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premiums in any sub-periods.  The SMB factor is consistently unstable throughout the periods, and the 
expected return on J-REITs with big market capitalization is getting higher in the second half periods.  
The HML factor also has negative premiums in the downward phase, which means that the expected 
return on growth stocks is getting higher than the value stocks in the J-REIT market.  To interpret Case 1 
and Case 2 collectively, it seems that the market factor and HML factor increase their Betas toward the 
market peak (mid-2007) and decrease afterwards, while the SMB factor behaves oppositely. 
 
Table [4-V]: Time-Series Regression in Sub-Periods 
 
 
 
4-4. Cross-Sectional Regression Result 
 Table [4-VI] shows the result of a cross-sectional regression during the whole period as well as 
during the sub-periods.  Colored cells represent significance at the 0.05 level.  
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It can be guessed that the market factor and the SMB factor have a turning point sometime 
between September 2004 and May 2007, in terms of their trends.  Other than that, there seems no clear 
difference of significance between the first and second half of the periods.  The Alpha basically 
maintains significance throughout any period, which means that, as a model, the FF model is not working 
to explain the result.  As a whole, the accuracy of the model and the explanatory power of the factors are 
low in the whole period and any sub-periods, as can be seen from the low R2 (adjusted R2) and the 
P-value exceeding 0.1.  Still, the model works relatively well in the external period in Case 1, and an 
additional sub-period analysis the result table of which is not shown in this paper indicates that the model 
extends the accuracy until mid-2005, when the J-REIT was expanding its size and was trending upwards.  
 
Table [4-VI]: Cross-Sectional Regression in Sub-periods 
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Table [4-VII] gives the same regression result of the whole period, classified by the main asset 
types of the individual J-REIT.  If classified by the investment asset type, it looks like the model works 
relatively well for the J-REITs mainly investing commercial assets, except for the fact that only the HML 
factor has a negative coefficient.  However, the numbers of the listed J-REITs with commercial assets is 
so small—only six—that result of this indication cannot be fully reliable.  For other portfolios by office- 
or residential-type J-REITs, the FF model does not work.  Therefore, even if classified by the asset 
attribution, the model still does not give a clear indication, as it did not in the all-REIT portfolio of Table 
[4-VI]. 
 
Table [4-VII]: Cross-Sectional Regressions in the Whole Period, by Asset Type 
  
 
In conclusion, despite the fact that some risk factors show their strong premiums depending on 
the sub-period, the FF model has so far evidenced a very limited capability to explain the risks and returns 
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of J-REITs.  The limited explanatory power of the model may be attributed to the shortness of the data 
period.  In addition, it can be inferred that independent factors specific to the J-REITs may have a strong 
effect on the performance of the J-REITs.  These conclusions confirm the past research on the J-REIT 
market, leaving the problem of how to find the best explanatory factor in pricing the J-REITs.  Still, this 
paper gained a significant outcome in that it made a thorough investigation and cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of the FF model in the J-REIT market with updated data and extended research methods. 
 38 / 63 
 
Chapter 5 REIT-Based Pure Play Indices: Characteristics and a Model 
 
By tracking REIT equity return data, bond data, and property holding data at monthly 
frequencies, this chapter explains a model and its data to construct “Pure Play” indices—de-leveraged 
segment-specific indices that represent commercial property market returns—while also incorporating the 
efficiency and liquidity of the public stock market.  This chapter first introduces the purpose and the 
characteristics of the “Pure Play” indices, and then explains the model to create those indices.  
Demonstration of the indices follows in the next chapter. 
 
5-1. Background and Purpose of the Index Development 
More and more properties are being held by REITs.  Researchers and investors expect public 
stock exchanges to provide more efficiency and higher liquidity than privately traded real estate 
investment.  However, in practice, the diversification and leverage of REITs have prevented investors 
from fully utilizing their superior liquidity to make target property segment investments.  For example, 
an investor’s target segment (asset types or locations) often does not exactly match property holdings of 
any REITs, because REITs tend to diversify their individual portfolios.  
Even with the existing property-type-specific REIT return/price indices that have been 
developed by a number of industry companies, these problems cannot be solved easily.  These indices 
have generally been constructed simply by classifying each REIT as representing a given property type.  
The indices are useful, but such an approach has problems in comparison with the direct-property based 
returns, which are broken out into some major types of commercial property.  Again, for one thing, REIT 
return indices do not control for the effect of leverage.  Another problem is that REIT-classification of 
these indices assumes that each REIT only represents a single type of property, an assumption that is 
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based on an over-simplification for any REIT that actually diversifies its investment types of commercial 
property and/or that changes its portfolio mix over time.   
In order to deal with these problems, REIT-based commercial property return indices, such as 
Pure Play Indices, were created.  This Pure Play approach retrieves underlying property returns for the 
specific property market segments, even in cases in which REIT investments are mixed among various 
property types and this mix changes over time.  The idea of the Pure Play Indices is to construct 
portfolios of long and short positions in REITs, based on their asset holdings in the various property 
market segments, such that the “Pure Play” portfolio eliminates exposure to all but one target segment. 
 
5-2. Development of the “Pure Play” Indices 
Geltner and Kluger [1995] proposed a regression-based model to develop a time-series index of 
historical, unlevered return to commercial properties held by UE-REITs, based on REIT share return 
information.  Through a pooled regression for the unlevered total asset returns on to the property-holding 
data by each REIT in each property type, and in each period of time, they got annual returns for each type 
of property from the regression coefficients.  Due to data limitations at that time, however, they could 
not produce a high frequency index.  However, they did find that this commercial property return index 
led appraisal-based indices, such as the NCREIF index. 
In a subsequent paper, Geltner and Kluger [1998] developed a model to construct “REIT-based 
Pure Play Portfolios,” a type of portfolio that approximates the “pure” performance of the target real 
estate sector with zero exposure to unwanted sectors in the long and short positions of REITs.  They 
extended their original regression-based approach into another index they dubbed, the “Pure Play Index,” 
which eliminates the exposure to unwanted real estate segments by means of a long-and-short portfolio 
that could in principle be held and traded.  This approach seemed technically straightforward, but was 
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only recently followed up with practical development. 
Horrigan, Case, Geltner, Pollakowski [2009] refined the Pure Play Index with the benefits of 
new, abundant REIT data and modified methodologies.  To gain historical segment-specific returns for 
the US-REIT market, they explored both levered and de-levered models that attribute REIT returns to 
underlying property segment holdings, with or without adjusting for debt held on REIT balance sheets.  
They performed the models in a separate regression for each period, rather than a pooled regression as in 
Geltner and Kluger [1995].  Then they demonstrated that the regression approach and the long/short 
hedge portfolio approach are equivalent, and that a 16-segment classification of property asset types and 
geographical regions provides good granularity with high frequency potential in the U.S. 
 In the Japanese real estate market, researchers and industry practitioners have launched a 
number of property return indices.  Those indices are mostly based on appraisals, since a large, reliable 
electronic property transaction database is not yet available for practical use in Japan.  Many of the 
indices, except the ARES J-REIT property index, employ in-house appraisals or a database of original 
sales/asking prices of providers,, and are open exclusively to members.  Endo [2006] widely reviewed 
the indices currently available from industry companies, and proposed a model to remove the lagging 
effect of the appraisal-based investment indices, for the purpose of inferring the “true” private real estate 
returns from them. 
The “Pure Play” approach can be useful as a unique information source for a variety of purposes. 
First, for example, they can suggest the relevant price discovery in each property market segment, such as 
the segments tracked in the U.S. by the Moody’s/REAL CPPI and NCREIF indices, since the REIT-based 
indices are likely to lead private direct property market indices during market turning points.  Second, 
the Pure Play Indices can offer highly frequent estimates for underlying property markets at various 
segment levels, with efficiency and granularity, based on daily REIT share closing prices.  The high 
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frequency can be useful in principle for synthetic investment in property through derivatives such as 
swaps or exchange-traded funds (ETF).  Third, ability to trade Pure Play Indices through long and short 
positions of REITs that compose portfolios enables arbitrage between the underlying portfolio and 
facilitates the pricing of derivatives.   This is also an advantage in the construction of ETFs.  It is 
possible to add or subtract leverage synthetically by scaling the portfolio weights and using debt or bond 
investments.  In addition, a by-product of this approach could be a quantitative measure of REIT-level 
property management performance.   
Pure Play Portfolios, defined as the long and short position weights in the constituent REITs, 
may be generated purely from structural information on REIT property holdings.  The combination of 
various targeted Pure Play Portfolios can serve as an investment vehicle to make an investment portfolio 
that is exactly balanced across sectors (or otherwise allocated across segments), making them useful for 
hedging, speculation, or synthetic investment into portfolios targeted or balanced by a property market 
segment. 
 
5-3. Model 
This paper applies those techniques presented by Horrigan et al. to J-REITs over each month 
from January 2006 to April 2009,14 a period when a numbers of J-REITs were already listed with sizable 
asset portfolios.   
(i) Pure Play Index 
The methodology that this thesis will apply to the Japan market is Pure Play Indices by the 
de-levered regression model as described in Horrigan, Case, Geltner, Pollakowski [2009]—a model which 
                                                   
14 A de-listed J-REIT is included until the month when it was de-listed. 
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modified Geltner and Kluger [1995]—for three major industry segment types (office, residential, and 
commercial).  The model runs a separate regression for each period over the whole experimental period 
for the de-levered J-REIT capital returns on proportional property segment holdings of each J-REIT (each 
period).  The coefficients generated from this regression model reflect the estimated “segment returns,” 
returns of the underlying property segment.   
Pure Play Model (regress across all REIT i = 1,2,…,N, in each period t): 
roai,t = bO,txO,i,t + bR,txR,i,t + bC,txC,i,t +εi,t …(1) 
where: 
roai,t…de-levered capital returns in period t to REITi.   
xO,i,t …percentage of REITi’s total assets that are office-type properties (by dollar value of assets) in 
period t 
xR,i,t …percentage of REITi’s total assets that are residential-type properties (by dollar value of assets) in 
period t 
xC,i,t …percentage of REITi’s total assets that are commercial-type properties (by dollar value of assets) in 
period t 
εi,t…the error term (the idiosyncratic return) of REITi in period t  
Note that by definition: 
xO,i,t + xR,i,t + xC,i,t =1 
The error term εi here represents the specific idiosyncratic performance of REITi apart from the 
systematic performance (across all REITs) of the underlying properties.  It reflects management effects 
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and random effects that are unique to REITi.  The εi, term causes "excess" volatility (unrelated to the 
underlying property market segment returns), which we would like to minimize in our indices (and hence 
in the Pure Play Portfolios). 
In order to eliminate miscellaneous property exposures, this paper gathers them into a single 
“other” segment and excludes any J-REITs with over 30% of an “other” segment in their property 
holdings.  The regression includes J-REITs with less than 30% of “other,” and rescales the remaining 
segment exposures to equal one.  The de-levered capital returns can be calculated on the basis of the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), which accounts for the identity of each J-REIT as follows 
(omitting an explanation for the repetition of denotes):  
roai,t = (equity/total asset)*ri,t + (debt/total asset)*cost of debtt …(2) 
where: 
equity…total stockholders’ equity (market price) of REITi at time t 
debt…total liability as of the semi-annual fiscal term end of REITi 
total asset…sum of total stockholders’ equity and total liability of REITi 
 As a proxy, the same cost of debt—that is, the average debt rate of all the J-REITs at the end of 
term—is applied to every J-REIT for the period within the semi-fiscal term because of limits to the 
availability of data, although in principle unique debt rates at each J-REIT level would be better.  The 
equity/total asset data and debt/total asset data are updated monthly for each semi-annual fiscal term in 
this study.  The equity/total asset ratios were stable with a mean of 50.0% over the period.  The author 
creates the property holdings share and the debt amount of each J-REIT on a monthly basis, by smoothing 
the balances from the beginning to the end of the semi-annual fiscal period. 
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 In order to gain some insight into the performance of the Pure Play Indices, this paper contrasts 
these with the STBRI J-REIT indices,15 an investment performance benchmark of J-REITs that is 
calculated in line with NAREIT/FTSE Indices.  For comparison, the STBRI J-REIT indices are also 
delivered in this experiment (similar to the individual REIT returns used to compute the Pure Play 
Indices). 
 
(ii)  Pure Play Portfolio 
This paper then develops a couple of examples of Pure Play Portfolios, based on REIT-based 
segment-specific property returns calculated from the above-mentioned Pure Play Model (formula (1)), in 
order to illustrate what a typical portfolio of this sort looks like, in terms of the typical shares of long and 
short weights (or positions) in the individual REITs.  This is to illustrate the typical nature of the Pure 
Play Portfolios.  The Pure Play Portfolios are calculated and presented in this thesis for the monthly 
period of May 2007 as the turn the peak of the market, and for February 2009 as the bottom. 
  We define a Pure Play Portfolio as a portfolio with unit exposure to the target segment, and 
zero exposure to all the other segments.  For instance, based on formula (1), by eliminating the pure 
returns to the non-target segments, the return to the portfolios (rp) that target an office segment can be 
expressed as follows: 
rp = rO + (wiei) … (3) 
where: 
wi…percentage of the portfolio’s holdings in REITi 
                                                   
15 For information about the STBRI J-REIT Index, see chapter 2. 
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under constraints for a Pure Play Portfolio for a single target segment (which is office in the example 
below): 
wixR,i  = 0, wixC,i  = 0, and wixO,i  = 1 
The variance of the portfolio (3) can be simplified as: 
VAR(rp) = VAR(rO) + {wi2VAR(ei)} … (4) 
As in Holly el al., this paper assumes that the variance of the idiosyncratic return, ei, of REITi is 
inversely proportional to the dollar value of its property holdings (totali).  So the variance of the Pure 
Play Portfolio can be expressed as:  
VAR (rp) = VAR(rO) + (wi2*1/totali) …(5) 
As formula (5) indicates, for the purpose of portfolio optimization—which generally means 
minimizing the variance of the portfolio return (subject to the Pure Play constraints)—the solution is 
governed entirely by the second term in the preceding formula. 
Finally, in order to gain some ideas of the type of role that the Pure Play Indices might play in 
investment strategy, this paper performs an optimal mean-variance portfolio allocation analysis, 
considering three asset classes: stocks, bonds, and real estate.  Real estate is represented here by the 
investment in the Pure Play Portfolios presented above, with returns of the three-property segments 
equally weighted.  As for indices of stocks and bonds, this paper uses TOPIX and subscription yields of 
ten-year government bonds. 
 By introducing the past literature and the model, this chapter has presented a methodology that 
can create Pure Play Indices at a high rate of frequency with the REIT data, thereby providing a unique 
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opportunity to track the commercial property market; and potentially to make targeted investments 
synthetically or via constructed Pure Play Portfolios, as well as to construct hedges in the real estate 
market, and to support derivatives trading. 
 47 / 63 
 
Chapter 6 REIT-Based Pure Play Indices: A Demonstration on Japanese Property Type 
Sectors 
  
This chapter demonstrates the methodology described in the previous chapter, by applying it to 
J-REITs.  We first describe the data and then the results of the analysis. 
 
6-1. Data Analysis 
This study is for each month from January 2006 to April 2009.  Table [6-I] shows the number 
of underlying properties for the ARES J-REIT Property Database.16  Since May 2004, all three major 
property segments (office, residential, and commercial) have been ready on the J-REIT market. By around 
the end of 2005, the number of properties had grown to one third of the current number, so we consider 
that the period after January 2006 has sufficient data for this study.17  
 
Table [6-I]: Number of Underlying Properties in the J-REIT Market 
 
(Created by the author, based on data from ARES) 
                                                   
16 The ARES J-REIT Property Database is a service provided by The Association of Real Estate Securitization 
(ARES).  It lists information concerning real estate, leasehold rights and surface rights for real estate and trust 
beneficiary rights placed in trust that are owned by listed J-REITs. 
17 The distribution by values mirrors that for the number of properties. 
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 Table [6-II] represents a summary of historical J-REIT investment in properties over the period.  
As described in Chapter 2, in May of 2007 it was the turning point in the market when the returns to 
J-REITs changed from positive to negative.  The overall mean value of the returns over the entire period 
shown at the bottom of the table is almost zero, since the study period contains both the up-market and the 
down-market.  Also, as is apparent from the standard deviation at the bottom of the same table, the 
composition of the property share holdings has not changed much.   
Table [6-III] classifies J-REITs into four levels of property-type concentration based on the 
average property share holdings over the entire period, and summarizes the results into the three major 
segments plus “others.”  In that table, every segment has many J-REITs in 0% holding, which indicates 
that J-REIT tends to focus on one or two property segments.  REITs investing in office and/or residential 
segments tend to have those segments as their main assets, while REITs investing in commercial have 
those as their minor assets.  A small number of J-REITs have their assets in the “others” segment, and 
even if they have, their share holdings in “others” were just a portion of the total. 
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Table [6-II]: Summary of Historical J-REIT Property Investment 
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Table [6-III]: J-REIT Investment Concentration by Property Type 
 
(Created by the author, based on the individual J-REIT’s annual report) 
 
6-2. Result and Analysis 
(i) Pure Play Indices 
The results of the estimates of monthly REIT-based property return indices for the three property 
segments over the period January 2006 – April 2009 are presented in Table [6-IV] as the cumulative 
capital value levels (price indices, in effect).  In the table, they are compared with the STBRI-JREIT 
Aggregated Sector Index that represents J-REIT returns to the aggregated sectors, adjusted for leverage.  
All three segment indices compare favorably with the STBRI-JREIT Aggregated Sector Index in that they 
present a similar picture, but in some cases with less volatility.  The STBRI-JREIT Aggregated Sector 
Index basically moves among those Pure Play Indices, but starts to shoot downward in the latter half of 
2008 when the consecutive defaults of J-REITs or J-REIT sponsors occurred.  The downward trend can 
probably be attributed to the effect of “non-pure” (non-target) segments within the STBRI-JREIT Index 
against those negative events, because REITs tend to hold a mixture of properties from different segments 
for portfolio diversity.  The indices have recently trended upward since 2009, which may anticipate a 
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recovery for the entire market. 
 Table [6-V] and Table [6-VI] show the same results based on the office and residential segments, 
respectively.  Due to data constraints, the STBRI-JREIT Index for the commercial sector could not be 
compared with the Pure Play Commercial Index18.  In Table [6-V], the Pure Play Office Index tracks 
similarly to the STBRI-JREIT Office Index.  This seems natural because many J-REITs have office 
properties as their major assets.  In contrast, in Table [6-VI], the STBRI-JREIT Residential Index starts 
to underperform the Pure Play Residential Index at the end of 2007, and the gap then becomes larger in 
fall of 2008, as is shown in Table [6-IV].  This underperformance of returns to residential J-REITs 
assumedly also reflects the effect of the non-pure segments within REITs against the negative market 
trend, and therefore indicates it is residential J-REITs that mostly contribute to the overshooting 
downward of the STBRI-JREIT Aggregated Sector Index in Table [6-IV]. 
 
Table [6-IV]: Pure Play Indices vs. STBRI J-REIT Aggregated Sector Index-Cumulative Return  
 
 
 
                                                   
18 The Pure Play has superiority to it in the flexibility of creating as many segments as one likes. 
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Table [6-V]: Pure Play Office Index vs. STBRI J-REIT Office Index - Cumulative Return 
 
 
Table [6-VI]: Pure Play Residential Index vs. STBRI J-REIT Residential Index - Cumulative Return 
 
  
Look at Table [6-VII], which presents the basic statistics and correlations of Pure Play returns 
and STBRI JREIT Office/Residential Indices by sub-periods.  The first sub-period from January 2006 to 
May 2007 stands for the upward-market term of J-REITs, and the second sub-period for the rest of the 
study period for the downward-market term.  Not surprisingly, Pure Play returns are mostly positive in 
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the upward term, and are negative in the downward.  The trends of Pure Play returns are led for the most 
part by office segments, somewhat by commercial, and least of all by residential segments.  The standard 
deviations (volatilities) of Pure Play returns in the downward period are larger than those in the upward 
period, and thus the overall trend in the whole period would be dragged more by the downward trend.  In 
terms of the correlation among Pure Play returns and J-REIT returns by each sector, total correlations 
between the sectors are high in any sub-period.  The tendency of the correlations across segments looks 
similar between the two indices, and does not change greatly over the two sub-periods.  The correlation 
of the Pure Play return in the residential segment with the J-REIT return in the residential increases in the 
second sub-period, because the residential is the sector that was most affected by the crash in the equity 
market.  
 
Table [6-VII]: Basic Statistics and Correlation of Pure Play Indices in the First Sub-period (Jan. 2006 ~ 
May 2007) and the Second Sub-period (Jun. 2007 ~ Apr. 2009) 
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(ii) Pure Play Portfolios 
In Table [6-VIII], chart (a) shows sample of Pure Play Portfolio weights in each segment—of 
office, residential, and commercial—in the month of May 2007, which was the peak of J-REIT market 
capitalization.  Chart (b) shows the same portfolio weights in February 2009, which was the bottom.  
Highlighted cells have negative weights (short positions).  In chart (a), in which the office is a target 
segment of the portfolio, an investor needs to take a short position in a great number of residential 
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J-REITs.  When residential is a target, the opposite is the case. When the commercial is a target, a short 
position should be high in office and the rest in residential J-REITs.  At any rate, the weight is widely 
distributed among J-REITs.  In the downward phase illustrated in chart (b), however, the weight is 
highly concentrated in a few J-REITs that are still outperforming the average J-RET return and are 
specializing in a certain property segment.  Additionally, almost a half of short positions move from 
single-segment focusing REITs to multiple-segment (complex) diversifying REITs. 
Table [6-IX] represents the Markowitz efficient portfolios of the three asset classes (stocks, 
bonds, real estate – with real estate represented by the Pure Play Index), as a function of the target return 
rates on the horizontal axis.  Since the period studied from January 2006 to April 2009 is the period with 
the highest volatility both in the equity market and in the real estate market and when mean returns to 
stocks and real estate over the period were actually negative, it is natural that stocks and real estate do not 
play a role in optimizing the portfolio in chart (a).  In chart (b), which covers the first sub-period until 
May 2007 when the equity and the real estate both had an “up” market, real estate had a strong negative 
correlation with bonds, so that it plays a significant role.  Chart (c), which covers the second sub-period 
thereafter, resembles chart (a).  The data period of the Pure Play Indices in this study may be still too 
short to derive a stable interpretation from it.  If a longer period of data is available in the future, an 
investor will be able to construct a more asset-distributed portfolio.  
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Table [6-VIII]: Sample Portfolio Segment Weights – Office (O), Residential (R), Commercial (C) 
Segments  
(a) May 2007 (the peak of J-REIT market capitalization) 
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(b) February 2009 (the bottom of J-REIT market capitalization) 
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Table [6-IX]: Markowitz Mean-Variance Diagram by three Asset Classes (Stocks, Bonds, Real Estate) 
with Real Estate as a Pure Play Index (equally-weighted segments)  
 
(a) Whole Period from Jan. 2006 ~ Apr. 2009 
 
(b) First Sub-period from Jan. 2006 ~ May. 2007 
 
(c) Second Sub-period from Jun. 2007 ~ Apr. 2009 
 
 59 / 63 
 
 In conclusion, this chapter confirms that REIT-based property return indices (or portfolios) can 
be constructed with unit exposure only to a desired property segment and with minimum idiosyncratic 
risk, on the basis of J-REIT return data, property holdings data, and financial information.  We find that 
the REIT-based property return indices have a similar volatility to J-REIT return indices, but are 
somewhat less volatile.   
 While the Pure Play Indices generated have various potential uses for investment and provide 
unique information about the market, more interesting insights and a more developed study would be 
possible if longer types of data, and a greater number, were available in the real estate market for J-REITs.  
For example, a reliable private-market-based/ transaction-based property return index is currently not 
available in the Japanese real estate market, so that unfortunately it is impossible to get insight by 
comparing Pure Play Indices with such indices, a comparison which has already been studied in the 
US-REIT market.  Moreover, data infrastructure of J-REIT property asset and financial information is 
not built at a level of high frequency and detail.  It is difficult to develop Pure Play Indices by crossing 
property types and regions, or to construct a monthly dataset that is consistent with the J-REIT’s actual 
financial or property holding situations. (Keep in mind that this paper is intending to smooth the data 
between the ending balance and beginning balance of the semi-annual financial term).   
 Considering the potential important contribution of these types of indices and tradable portfolios 
described in the previous chapter, there is a need for a more frequent and comprehensive dataset in the 
Japanese real estate market. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
 This paper pursued a two-fold objective about J-REITs’ performance: first, to conduct factor 
loadings of the J-REIT return (stock return at a firm-level); second, to demonstrate “Pure Play” indices, 
REIT-based property return indices without exposure to unwanted property segments.  The objective 
was to capture the comprehensive performance-characteristics of J-REITs that are hybrid products of real 
estate and financial securities. 
 After establishing the importance of such research in the first chapter and the background of the 
J-REIT market in the second chapter, this paper accomplished those two objectives.  For the first 
objective, in order to discover the systematic determinants of J-REIT returns, this paper conveyed factor 
loadings based on the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model in a time-series and a cross-sectional 
regression for monthly returns of all the individual J-REITs from September 2001 to September 2008.  
As a result, the paper found that the explanatory power of the FF model for the J-REIT performance was 
limited in almost any sub-period probably due to shortage of data periods and to the existence of a 
specific factor to J-REITs.  This result followed the findings from past similar research, but confirmed 
them more comprehensively and visually.  Resolution of the specific factor to J-REITs will be a major 
topic in the J-REIT market in future. 
 Second, this paper aimed to demonstrate the Pure Play Indices for office, residential, and 
commercial property types with historical data of J-REIT returns and property share holdings.  The 
resulted Pure Play Indices performed similarly with J-REIT equity return indices, but with less volatility.  
They once lost touches with J-REIT return indices around from 2008, which is likely attributed to the 
effect of “non-pure” segments especially within residential REITs.  The Pure Play Portfolios that were 
created only from one period of J-REITs’ property share holding data indicated that the portfolio weights 
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change significantly, depending on the timing.   Therefore, elements of the Pure Play method such as a 
high rate of frequency and granularity will potentially be useful in timely determining an investment 
strategy in the J-REITs.  Also, these benefits can be true to optimal mean-variance portfolios that invest 
in other types of asset as well, such as stocks and bonds. 
Considering the results from the two studies collectively, effective factors of J-REIT returns 
have still been left to something specific to J-REITs, and interestingly, the REIT-based property returns 
performed similarly, at least on a normal basis.  Further tracking of the relationship between returns to 
pure/non-pure property segments and returns to J-REITs will also be one of the upcoming challenges for a 
comprehensive understanding of J-REITs’ performance.   
As for data inquiry, although both of these studies will be greatly improved with more abundant 
data about the J-REIT market and real estate market, it can be expected that the Pure Play Indices will 
leave more room for improvement.  For instance, a longer period or more detail information of J-REITs’ 
property share holdings will enable cross-segmented property return indices with property use and region.  
If private direct property market indices were available, the Pure Play Indices might be able to suggest the 
relevant price discovery in each property market segment by comparing with them, as the past U.S.-REIT 
study proved the REIT-based indices lead private direct property market indices.  
This two-fold study showed a demonstration of returns from J-REITs to derive risk of J-REITs 
and different types of information of properties.  Due to the limited length of history, however, the study 
could not make the fullest possible use of its potential.  As the J-REIT market matures more in future, 
the approaches here will become more valuable to offer a rich resource of information about risk of 
J-REITs and their underlying-properties. 
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